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ABSTRACT
One of the foremost theoretical problems in operations re-
search is that of choosing an appropriate measure of effective-
ness. Since such a choice involves value judgments, the point
of view is taken that the purpose and preferences of the subject
(decision maker) should be used as the basis for defining the
measure of effectiveness. Use is made of established results in
the field of economics, specifically utility theory, to show
that the ordinary notions of subjective preference are suffi-
cient, under certain plausible conditions for a single subject,
to define a measure of effectiveness which is unique up to a
linear transformation. An illustrative example of naval interest
is given.
This thesis was written during the period January - June,
1957, at the U. S. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Cali-
fornia. The writer wishes to express his appreciation to
Professor C. C. Torrance for his encouragement, guidance, and
many helpful suggestions during the writing of this thesis, to
Professor C. A. Magwire for his constructive criticism while act-
ing as second reader, and to Miss Bessie Allan for her invaluable




The author feels compelled to offer a preliniraary explana-
tion of the circumstances which led to the writing of this paper.
The principle reasons are two-fold. First, inspiration was
drawn from articles appearing recently in Operations Research ,
the Journal of the Operations Research Society of America, not-
ably those authored by B. 0. Koopman of Columbia University \_lj
and Charles Hitch of The Rand Corporation £2J > pointing up cer-
tain logical failings so frequently encountered in the choice of
measures of effectiveness, or criteria. Secondly, there has been
a personal dissatisfaction with the techniques of problem formu-
lation, particularly in the choice of measures of effectiveness,
evidenced in many reports of operations research studies used as
text and reference material in various courses of study at the
United States Naval Postgraduate School.
The particular line of investigation of this problem was sug-
gested by Hitch in writing
The only discipline I know which has made any attempt to
explore the characteristics of operations criteria
is economic theory.
By following this lead, a remarkable similarity was discovered
between the problems of economists in attempting to develop a
satisfactory theory of utility and the difficulties of operations
researchers in dealing with the problem of choice of criteria.
Historically, economists first conceived of utility as quan-
titatively measurable, i.e, - a number. Now every claim of meas-
urability must ultimately be based on some immediate sensation,
Such as light, heat, muscular effort, length, etc.
iii

which need not and possibly cannot be analyzed further. In the
case of utility, the immediate sensation of preference for one
object or event as against another provided this basis. In eco-
nomics Pareto first observed that an equality relation of utility
differences would suffice to prescribe a measure of utility which
would be unique up to a linear transformation. Exactly the same
argument was made by Euclid in his classical derivation of numeri-
cal distances. The utility difference relation was objected to
by many economists on the grounds that such a relation did not
stem from a "natural" sensation. Von Neumann and Morgenstern
offered a way around this difficulty by. postulating that individ-
uals could compare not only objects or events but also combina-
tions of objects or events when expected with certain stated
probabilities. Even this suggestion has not found universal ac-
ceptance and the question of measurability of utility remains
unresolved. The modern method of indifference curve analysis
is a mathematical method to describe the situation in which the
concept of utility differences is not admitted.
Like the economists' classical concept of utility, opera-
tions researchers traditionally regard the measure of effective-
ness as numerical. But upon what sensation is it based? This
question, it is believed, has not been adequately answered and
it is suggested that herein may lie solutions to some of OR's
problems.
In this thesis the viewpoint is taken that, as with econom-
ic utility, the measure of effectiveness should be based upon
the "natural" sensation of preference, specifically the prefer-
ences of the decision maker, executive, client, etc. referred
iv

to herein as the "subject". After an introductory section this
viewpoint is, it is hoped, somewhat justified in Sections 2
and 3« In order to retain the numerical character of the meas-
ure of effectiveness, the notions of utility as set forth by
von Neumann and Morgenstern and extended by Dalkey, are adopted.
In Sections h through 6 these notions are interpreted in a form
more suitable for OR and a measure of effectiveness (value func-
tion) derived which is mathematically equivalent to the von
Neumann-Morgenstern individual utility function. The value func-
tion derived is however more general in that it allows for moral,
aesthetic, military, or any other sense of value as well as the
strictly utilitarian sense. In Section 7 an example of the ap-
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(Listed in order of use in the text)
x an alternative (also any lower case English letter,
e.g. - y, u, v, etc.
)
R a binary relation between alternatives (preference
or indifference)
P a binary relation between alternatives (preference)
I a binary relation between alternatives (indifference)
[x,y,o^j an option
ro a binary relation between alternatives (comparability)
a binary relation between alternatives (incompara-
bility)
V a value function
C an indifference class of alternatives
the objective




A typical operations research study may be described as
consisting of three phases — formulation of the problem, solu-
tion of the problem, and implementation of the solution. Such
a description is functional rather than sequential, and by no
means unique. For example, factors arising in the solution or
implementation phases may well lead to a reformulation of the
problem. However the description is convenient in defining the
scope of this thesis — the formulation of an operations re-
search problem and, specifically, the choosing of a measure of
effectiveness. It is not concerned with techniques of solution
nor with aspects of implementation.
An operations research study begins naturally with problem
formulation, at least an initial formulation. It is much like
defining the rules of a game before play commences. The rules




(b) a method of scoring
(c) a statement of allowed plays or actions
By "an objective" is not meant the customary one of winning, but
rather that which constitutes winning, e.g. - having the highest
(or lowest) score at the end of a certain period of time, accom-
plishing a certain feat before one's opponent, etc. The method
of scoring may range from a simple "win or lose" to a compli-
cated scheme of point assignment for certain achievements. Ac-
tions or plays may be limited by physical boundaries and by
specifying the types of action permitted and prohibited within
the physical bounds. It should be noted that game rules are

not rigid but are subject to change by mutual agreement of par-
ticipants. In organized sports rules committees meet periodically
to consider proposed changes to rules, but until such a change is
made all participants are governed by existing rules.
There is a close analogy between the defining of the rules
of a game and the formulation of an operations research problem.
In formulating an OR problem there should be specified among
other things:
(a) an objective or purpose .
(b) a measure of effectiveness
(c) alternative courses of action
In specifying the objective in an OR problem, as in a game, a
more precise statement than simply "best results" or "optimal
outcome" (i.e., - winning) should be made. The objective is that
which constitutes the best or optimum under the given circum-
stances. The measure of effectiveness is analogous to the meth-
od of keeping score in a game. It should assign to a given out-
come (result of a play) a unit of worth or value. The alterna-
tive courses of action correspond to the allowed plays in a game.
Just as in a game certain plays are favored under certain circum-
stances because they tend to bring about the winning state, in an
operations research study certain courses of action will be de-
termined to be better because they are expected to bring about
the achievement of the objective or that (feasible) outcome which
has associated the highest worth or value.
Certain aspects of the above analogy deserve further empha-
sis. Consider first the relation between the objective (purpose)
and the method of scoring (measure of effectiveness). The score

measures directly the achievement of objective. This holds true
even if the concept of objective is generalized beyond the nar-
row one of winning. The purpose in a given contest may not be
to win but to "hold the score down", such as when a football
team plays a vastly superior opponent. The score, even in this
case, provides a direct measure of achievement of objective.
Such should be true with a measure of effectiveness. Perhaps
the most desirable outcome is unattainable because of technolog-
ical or other constraints. In such a case the measure of effec-
tiveness should still provide a direct measure of achievement of
objective, at least in the sense of how nearly it is approached.
Next consider the relation between method of scoring and
allowed plays or actions. Score "in a game is (usually) not re-
lated directly to plays or actions but rather to the outcomes
which result. For example, there is no award of points in foot-
ball for attempting a forward pass or even for the successful
completion of one. Points are awarded only if as a result the
necessary yardage is gained to score a touchdown. However, the
allowed actions are related, at least stochastically, to the
outcomes so that, for a given play attempted, it should be pos-
sible to determine the expectation of score. Similarly a meas-
ure of effectiveness is not necessarily related directly to an
alternative course of action but rather to the outcome or state
resulting from such a course of action. It is by estimating
the expected outcome of a given course of action that a value
can be assigned to the various courses of action. It should be
noted here that it is the role of the mathematical model (or
other technique of problem solution) to estimate the outcome

which will result from selecting a given course of action. In-
deed it is the various controllable variables (parameters) in-
volved in the mathematical model which determines the feasible
courses of action.
A problem of theoretical concern in operations research, and
increasingly so, is that of selecting an appropriate measure of ef-
fectiveness. The difficulties encountered in attempting to associ-
ate a real number with factors that have no "natural" scale of meas-
urement (e.g. - good will, satisfaction, etc.) are well known. E-
qually difficult are the problems in which the objective is multi-
dimensional and the various factors are "incomparable" (e.g. - loss
of human life versus attainment of a military objective). As dis-
cussed in the introduction, the problem of selecting a measure of ef-
fectiveness has a parallel in the concept of "utility" in the field
of economics. Like a measure of effectiveness utility was at first
conceived as quantitatively measurable, i.e., as a real number.
Clearly every claim of measurability must be based on some immedi-
ate sensation, which possibly cannot (and need not) be analyzed
further- In the case of utility the immediate sensation of prefer-
ence provides this basis. Preference, however, only permits it to
be said that for one person the utility of one object or situation
is greater than the utility of another such object or situation.
It does not by itself provide an adequate basis for measurability.
It is at this point that economists diverge widely in viewpoints.
Some contend that there is no other "natural" sensation appropri-
ate to the problem than that of preference, hence "measurable
utility" is not admitted. The method of indifference curve

analysis is a mathematical procedure to describe this situation;
Von Neumann and Morgenstern hypothesized the existence of a nat-
ural operation rather than another natural sensation — the a-
bility to distinguish (in the sense of preference) between an al-
ternative and two others expected with certain probabilities.
With this hypothesis and assuming the complete ordering by pref-
erence of any set of alternatives it was shown that a numerical
utility was determined which was unique up to a linear transfor-
mation. Dalkey, extending the work of von Neumann and Morgen-
stern, showed that the introduction of this type of expectation
(which he termed "options") made unnecessary the assumption of
complete ordering by preference, and thus made the results appli-
cable to a wide class of partial orderings, i.e. - multi-dimen-
sional vector quantities.
In this thesis the results of von Neumann and Morgenstern
and Dalkey are translated to the problem of determining a meas-
ure of effectiveness in an operations research problem, partic-
ularly those in which the objective is multi-dimensional.

2. Optimality and Subjectivity-
One of the most commonly used "words in the field of opera-
>-
tions research is the word "optimal". A typical dictionary de-
fines QQ
Optimal - best, most favorable or most conducive to a given
end, esp. under fixed conditions.
It is to be noted that, as defined, optimality is not intrinsic
but depends upon the end or purpose involved. Before the opti-
mal can be determined the end or purpose must be specified. The
meaning of these words is embodied in the definition [_3j
Purpose - that which one sets before himself as an object to
be attained, the end or aim to be kept in view in
any plan, measure, exertion, or operation.
This definition, by no means unique, implies that purpose is sub-
jective rather than objective by nature. However the nature of
purpose is a question which properly belongs to philosophy rath-
er than science.
Philosophy, which from the Greek means "love of wisdom",
differs from science in that both the natural and social sciences
base their theories on established fact, whereas philosophy cov-
ers the area of inquiry where, essentially, no facts are avail-
able. Originally science as such did not exist and philosophy
covered the entire field. But as facts become available and
tentative certainties emerged, the sciences broke away from meta-
physical speculation to pursue their different aims. Thus phys-
ics was once a realm of philosophy and it is only recently that
such fields as psychology have been established as sciences a-
part from philosophy. The concern of modern philosophers (Dewey,

et al) in attempting to develop a theory of value shows promise
that questions of purpose and related matters may someday de-
velop into a true science, but for the present such is not the
case. \JfJ
In an operations research study an initial concern is the
specification of an objective, i.e. - the determination of pur-
pose. However since the nature of purpose is a philosophical
conjecture, the scientific treatment of an operations research
problem requires that the nature of purpose be hypothesized.
In this thesis it is hypothesized that purpose is subjective by
nature. This point of view is adopted for two reasons. First,
a number of theoretical difficulties which arise from an objec-
tive viewpoint of purpose are avoided. Secondly, the idea is
intuitively appealing that the desires of the person(s) various-
ly termed the client, decision maker, executive, customer, etc.
are the proper basis for determination of purpose rather than
the ideas of an analyst or some other person not charged with
t
the responsibility for results of a decision.
An hypothesis of subjective preference does not conflict
with the traditional demands of science that facts be publicly
observable and verifiable. Nor does it imply that the analyst
should let the customer define the problem. It means that in a
given problem the analyst should specify the objective only after
suitable observation and testing, if necessary, of the subject of
the problem (i.e. - the client, decision maker, etc.).
Although an assumption of the subjective nature of purpose
has certain justifications, even a superficial investigation
from such a starting point soon encounters difficulties. Perhaps

the most disturbing is the problem of determining the objective
of a group. This question has been treated extensively by Arrow
and others in developing the theory of welfare economics. p5
A social welfare function is defined as a method for obtaining
group preferences given the preferences of the invidual members
of the group. An election system, for example, gives a "commu-
nity choice" of candidates as a function of voters' choices.
Arrow has shown (1) that if individual preferences are expressed
as rankings of various alternatives and (2) that if we require
certain "natural" conditions of any "acceptable" social welfare
function, then "acceptable" welfare functions do not exist. It
is shown that, under certain plausible conditions, any welfare
function is either "dictatorial" (group choice determined by one
individual) or "imposed" (no real choice exists by virtue of some
kind of constraint). Some writers have questioned the plausibil-
ity of Arrow's assumptions and, under different assumptions, have
obtained more intuitively acceptable results. [_6j A detailed
treatment of this problem is beyond the scope of this thesis.
Further it does not affect the large class of problems, common to,
operations research, wherein decisions are in fact made by an in-
dividual, i.e. - an executive, at least with advice of others of
a group. Therefore it will be assumed for the purposes of this
paper that the subject of a problem is a single individual, or is





In the preceding sections the formulation of an operations
research problem has been discussed in a general way and the hy-
potheses of subjective purpose and singular subject have been a-
dopted. To avoid ambiguity in the remaining sections the rather
special meanings to be attached to certain terms will be formal-
ized by explicit definition.
D.l Alterna cive - a state of a given system which is describ-
able by an n-dimensional vector.
As defined an alternative is not a possible course of action but
rather an outcome which might result from some course of action.
The outcome must be describable by an n-tuple of real numbers.
This is not such a restrictive requirement as it might at first
appear. It does not, for example, require that an intangible
factor such as "good will" be measured in dollar or other spe-
cific units; it requires only that some scale be established
which distinguishes in a suitable manner among the different lev-
els of "good will". Under these circumstances many such intan-
gibles can be "measured" in some suitable unit. (The conditions
under which this can be done are discussed in Section 5* )
A subject will' frequently be able to choose between two al-
ternatives, i.e. - to state or display a preference for one over
the other. Sometimes indifference will be exhibited, i.e. - the
two alternatives will be considered equally acceptable and neither
is preferred to the other. Occasionally a subject will be unable
to make a choice; he will be unwilling to choose one alternative
in preference to the other and yet is not indifferent. It
should not be expected that a subject always be able to judge

between two specified alternatives but a certain "consistency"
or "rationality" is required intuitively. For example, a ration-
al subject would not prefer A to B, B to C, and at the same time
prefer C to A. A subject might however be indifferent among
three or more alternatives.
Alternatives are considered as future conditions or events.
There is no apparent reason why alternatives located in different
time periods of the future should not be compared (i.e. - time is
considered as one component of the n-dimensional vector which de-
scribes an alternative), however, such a concept would introduce
a complication unnecessary for the purposes of this thesis. There-
fore it will be assumed that, in considering any particular set of
alternatives, all such alternatives are located at one and the
same time, preferably in the immediate future.
Preference and indifference are relations among alternatives
(see Appendix I). Instead of working with two relations it will
be convenient to define a single fundamental relation, denoted R,
and define preference and indifference formally in terms of R.
D.2 R is a binary relation between alternatives. xRy means
that a given subject confronted with a choice between
two alternatives, x and y, will choose x or will consid-
er x and y equally acceptable. xR'y means "not xRy".
D.^ P is a binary relation between alternatives. xPy means:
(a) xRy
(b) yR'x







The relation R as defined is similar to the relation "greater
than or equal to" in the space of real numbers; xRy is read "x
is preferred or indifferent to y". The relation P is similar to
the relation "greater than" in the space of real numbers; xPy is
read "x is preferred to y". The relation I is similar to the re-
lation "equals" in the space of real numbers; xly is read "x is
indifferent to y". It should be noted that I does not imply log-
ical identity. Logical identity is denoted "= ".
It is postulated that the fundamental relation R is a par-
tial ordering relation on any space of alternatives, S. Formal-
iy,
P.l (a ) xRx for all x 6 S
(b) xRy and yRz imply xRz
It can be readily shown from the postulated characteristics
of Rthat P and I as defined correspond to the intuitive notions
of preference and indifference. (See Appendix II).
P.
2
If x,y£S where x=(x 1? . . . ,xn ) and y=(y l9 . . . ,yn ):
(a) xRy if x iRy i for all i=l, ,n.
(b) xPy if xRy and x^Py^ for some i.
The implications of P. 2 are illustrated by the case in which the
n components of the alternative vectors have real numbers prescrib-
ed in such a way that, for each component, it is desirable to at-
tain the largest possible number. The relation R, in such a case,
corresponds exactly to the relation "greater than or equal to" and
the relation P to the relation "greater than". Also from P. 2 the
conditions for incomparability are immediate; if xRy does not hold
and yRx likewise does not hold, x and y are clearly incomparable
with respect to R (see Appendix I).
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An an example consider a military commander estimating his
battle losses. Suppose, for simplicity, his losses can be meas-
ured in terms of equipment destroyed (say aircraft) and personnel
lost (say the pilots). The state of the system of interest can
be described by a two dimensional vector (i,j), where i is the
number of aircraft lost and j is the number of pilots lost. If
i and j are represented as negative numbers, we may assume that
any (rational) commander would wish to maximize both i and j.
The most desirable possible outcome (with respect to losses) would
be vector (0,0). It may be assumed that any commander would pre-
fer the outcome (-2,-2) to the outcome (-5,-5)* However, these
two outcomes are R-comparable. If such a comparison is attempt-
ed between other possible outcomes, say (-2,-5) and (-5,-2), a
difficulty arises. Before preference can be determined some de-
cision of relative worth of -the two components under the given
conditions must 6e made, i.e. - in some manner the two outcomes
must be made comparable.
Having defined formally an alternative and a single funda-
mental relation, R, between alternatives, it is now possible to
define concisely the concept of an objective.
D.5 In a space of alternatives, S, if for a given subject:
(a) x6S
(b) xPy for all y£S, y=^x
x is the unique objective.
An objective is the most desirable possible outcome that could
result from any course of action. It seems unnecessary to show
formally the conditions under which an objective exists. It Is
12

intuitively clear that, if each component of the alternative
vectors is bounded by a finite maximum , the objective will ex-
ist and will be that outcome for which each component assumes
it's maximum value.
This assumes that a higher valued real number is to be preferred
to a lower valued one. This can always be made the case by tak-
ing negative numbers to describe a component in which a lower
valued (positive) real number would be preferred to a higher
valued number. Mathematically, such a space of alternatives




*f. The Complete Ordering of Alternatives
A single fundamental relation, R, has been defined and pos-
tulated to prescribe a partial ordering of any given space of
alternatives considered by a given subject. In some simple cases,
where the alternatives are one dimensional vectors, R will be a
complete ordering relation, e.g. - the alternatives are describ-
able as amounts of money. More commonly the alternatives will be
multi-dimensional and their direct conversion to a single dimen-
sion will be difficult if not impossible. As exemplified in the
preceding section, a military commander may be able to express
the value of a lost aircraft, but his problem in estimating the
worth of the lost pilot in the same units is obvious.
Under certain conditions the partial ordering relation R can
be extended to a complete ordering relation in the case of multi-
dimensional alternatives if it is assumed that a subject can
judge between an alternative and a combination of two others, say
u and v, where v is expected with probability ot and u with prob-
ability 1 - c< . This form of expectation will be called an option,
D.6 An option is an exclusive disjunction of two alterna-
tives where one must occur, denoted ru,v,0<j ? to be
read "v with probability <K and u with probability
1 - <K ".
Just as it was assumed that a subject could not always judge be-
tween two alternatives, it will be assumed that a subject may not
always be able to judge between an alternative and an option.
The nature of options is given by:
1^

P. "3 (a) For all x,y£ S, xrvy1 implies [x,y,©<3 £ S
where ^ <* £ \.
(b) xRyR2 implies the existence of an ^ , 0^^< -^\
)
such that yl [j^z, *] .
(c) xRy implies xR r"x,y,o<~] Ry where Ols**^ I.
(d) [x, Cx,y,of| ,&] I [x,y,°<y9] where 0<<*,/3£\
In P. 3, (a) allows the combination of two comparable alternatives
to form an option. In (b) the mutual comparability of three al-
ternatives implies the existence of an option composed of the two
"extremal" alternatives which is indifferent to the "middle" al-
ternative, (c) states that an alternative is to be preferred (or
indifferent) to any option involving the given alternative and a
less desirable one. (d) determines how options combine which is,
essentially, like mathematical expectation. In the remainder of
this section it is shown that the introduction of options is suf-
ficient under certain conditions to extend R to a complete order-
ing relation. In Section 5 it Is shown that the introduction of
options is sufficient to define a unique (up to a linear trans-
formation) numerical measure, the value function over the indif-
ference classes of a space of alternatives.
Before considering the sufficiency of options to extend R
to a complete ordering it will be convenient to redefine several
well known mathematical notions in forms suitable for this inves-
tigation.
D.7 x is a lower bound of a set, Q, of alternatives with
respect to R means that for every y€Q, yRx.
The symbol V" denotes comparability. See Appendix I.
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D.8 x is an upper bound of a set, Q, of alternatives with
respect to R means that for every y€Q, xRy.
D.9 Q is a quasi-lattice with respect to R means:
(a) Q is partially ordered by R
(b) Every pair x,y£Q has an upper bound and a
lower bound.
The following important theorem gives a condition under which a
space of alternatives is completely ordered by the relation R. \j\
T.l For a given subject, a space of alternatives S that is
a quasi-lattice with respect to R and that satisfies
P. 3 is completely ordered by R.
Proof: R is reflexive, asymmetric, and transitive by D.9(a),
hence only connexity need be shown to establish complete ordering
of S by R. If xrsy for all x,y6S (e.g. - alternatives are one
dimensional) the proof is complete, hence assume x[y for some
x,y€.S. Since S is a quasi-lattice with respect to R there is
some u which is a lower bound of x,y and some v which is an upper
bound of x,y. Then by D.7 and D.8 vRxRu and vRyRu. By P.l vRu,
hence v^u. By P. 3 tyiU,©T] € S, and there exist °<,/9 such that
xl Qv,u,oTJ and yl rv ? u i/3j » hence x/vy.
The implications of the above definitions and theorem may be
illustrated by referring again to the example of the military com-
mander estimating his battle losses (Section 3)« The space of al-
ternatives has as a lower bound the outcome (-n^,-n.<), where n^ is
the total number of aircraft and n* is the total number of pilots.
Clearly there could be no worse outcome than total loss of both
components. Similarly the upper bound of the space of alterna-
tives is the outcome (0,0), i.e. - the objective, or no losses.
16

Also the space of alternatives is a quasi-lattice since every pair
x,y has an upper bound and a lower bound, e.g. - the incomparable
outcomes (-2,-5) and (-5,-2) have as (one pair of) upper and
lower bounds respectively the outcomes (-2,-2) and (-5,-5)- Since
the space of alternatives is a quasi-lattice it is, upon the in-




The nature of value, like the nature of purpose, is a ques-
tion of philosophical concern. Whether value is objective (ob-
jects, etc. have intrinsic value apart from any personal rela-
tion), or subjective (objects, etc. have value only in respect
to some personal relation), or some intermediary of these view-
points is a matter of increasing interest in modern philosophy.
As with purpose it will be hypothesized that value is subjective
by nature. For the purposes of this thesis value will be defined
as follows:
D.10 Value - For a given subject and a given bounded space
of alternatives, S, if there is associated with
each x£ S a real number V(x) with the following
properties:
(a) For all x,y£S, xRy implies V(x)£.V(y)
(b) For all x,ye S, V(x)iV(y) implies xRy
then V(x) is called the value of x.
Such a definition is in harmony with a commonly accepted modern
philosophy of science (logical positivism) which is based on an
operational viewpoint. Measured quantities such as charge, tem-
perature, mass, and force are not thought of as things whose na-
ture is intuitively understood. They are defined as the objec-
tive results of certain prescribed operations that can be carried
out in a laboratory by any experimenter. So it is with value as
defined. Further, such a concept of value is more general than
the usual concept of utility. No attempt is made to specify
whether a particular choice is prompted by moral, utilitarian,
aesthetic or other considerations; it is simply observed that the
18

choice is made. Theoretically it is possible to determine which
of two alternatives has the greater value (to the subject) by con-
fronting the subject with the two and observing which is chosen in
preference to the other. There are, of course, many practical dif-
ficulties associated with such a proposed procedure. The determi-
nation of individual attitudes and preferences is a problem of
concern in modern psychology. Unfortunately even a superficial
treatment of such a field is beyond the scope of this thesis. It
will therefore be assumed that, since such a procedure is at
least theoretically possible, it can be carried out.
From the definition of value and P. 3 it follows that if such
a relation as xRy holds, then the relation V(x) > V( £x,y,oT] )> V(y ),
0^cx<l, must hold. Further since P. 3 (a) admits any option
formed by the combination of two comparable alternatives, i.e. -
a "continuum" of options between the two alternatives, then there
is a corresponding continuum of values between the values associ-
ated with two comparable alternatives. In other words the con-
tinuity of the space of alternatives (and options I ) implies a
#
continuity of the value function between the upper bound (objec-
tive) and the lower bound of the space.
Suppose that for a given subject and a given space of alter-
natives the following relations hold:
xRyRz
yR[x,z,0.53
In other words, the subject prefers (or is indifferent to) the al-
ternative y to a 50^-50% chance of obtaining x or z . Such a pref-
erence is a plausible basis for asserting that
V(x) - V(y) < V(y) - V(z)
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If the sense of the R relation had been reversed then the sense
of the inequality would also have been reversed, or if the sub-
ject had been indifferent, the value differences would have been
exactly equal. The formation of options thus provides a plau-
sible basis for the determination of value differences, or at
least the relative magnitudes of such. This assertion is iden-
tical with that made by von Neumann and Morgenstern
,
and is suf-
ficient for the determination of an essentially unique value
function.
A completely ordered space of alternatives may, upon the
introduction of options, be considered as a continuous one-dimen-
sional set of indifference classes. It is desired to coordinate
numbers, V, to the various indifference classes, C, of this set.
This can, of course, be done in many ways. Let V=V(C) be one
such coordination, where V(C)=V(x) for all x€C and such that if
C 1RC2RC3 and C 2R Vpi, C3, O.^Tj
then
VCCx) ^ V(C 2 ) %. V(C3> and
V(Ci) - V(C2) ^ V(C 2 ) - V(C3) for all Ci
.
Now suppose V = V'(C) is another such coordination and satis-
fies the same conditions as V. Then V may be regarded as a
mathematical function of V. This follows from the fact that for
every indifference class C there corresponds one and only one
number V and also one and only one number V. Consequently to
every number V there corresponds one and only one number V.
-^For a more detailed treatment of the justification and impli-
cations of such an assertion the reader is referred to "The
Notions of Utility", Ch.I, Section 3 [8]
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Let this correspondence be denoted V = f(V). Furthermore from
V 1 >V2 >V3 it follows that Vj_ > V' >. VA, and from V 1 - Vp^ V - V
it follows that V - V < V 1 - V. This means the function12 2 3
V = f(V) must satisfy the same conditions regardless of what
numbers V-j_, V
,
and V-j may be. From this and the continuity of
the function f (V) it follows that if
.




- f(V2 ) = f(V2 ) - f(V3 )





then the value, of the function f(V) at Vp is the arithmetic mean
of the values fCV^) and f(Vo), i.e. -
f(v2 )= i QfCVx) + f(v3 ) 2
The only continuous functions f (V) satisfying this condition for
any two numbers V]_ and V^ are the linear functions
V = f(V) = aV + b
where a and b are arbitrary constants. The arbitrariness of the
constant b means that the origin of the scale is undetermined;
the arbitrariness of the constant a means that no absolute size
is given but only relative size (unit of scale undetermined).
In summary, the sensation of preference allows recognition
of greater value and options permit the determination of value
differences. These conditions determine a value function which
is unique except for origin and unit of scale.
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6. The Measure of Effectiveness
Before discussing the measure of effectiveness it will be
well to summarize briefly the results of preceding sections.
A value function, V, has been determined which is unique except
for origin and unit of scale provided that the "natural"sensa-
tion of (singular subject) preference is adopted as a basis and
the operation of forming options is admitted. If these two
principle hypotheses are accepted then V is essentially deter-
mined. '
The role of the measure of effectiveness in an OR study has
been described as that of measuring -the achievement of an objec-
tive, or how nearly it is achieved. Clearly this is exactly what
the value function V accomplishes for objectives as defined by
D.5. Therefore, for a particular problem (given subject and
space of possible outcomes or alternatives) it is plausible. to
adopt the value function V as a measure of effectiveness. It is
apparent that if the subject is changed or a different space of
alternatives is considered, then the function V will very likely
be modified. It is the role of the mathematical model (or other
technique of problem solution) to establish suitable bounds upon
the considered space of alternatives and, in fact, to determine
such questions as the dimensionality of the space. This illus-
trates again the essential interrealatedness of the various
phases of an OR problem: the mathematical model employed for
solution determines the feasible courses of action and predicts
the expected outcomes, i.e. - defines a space of alternatives
to be considered for various courses of action, and the measure
of effectiveness, V, defined over the prescribed space of alter-
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natives determines the objective and the relative desirability
of the other possible outcomes or alternatives.
Certain characteristics of a measure of effectiveness are
expected a priori, regardless of subject or the particular space
of alternatives involved. Consider, for example, a given space
of alternatives of dimensionality two. (Dimensionality two is
considered for simplicity but the generalization to higher di-
mensionality will be evident). Suppose further that the two di-
mensions are not directly comparable, but that for each a higher
real number descriptive of system state is to be preferred to a
lower number. This can always be so arranged since, if a higher
number is in fact less desirable than a lower number, such as
some type of cost or loss, the negative can be taken and the situ-
ation reversed. Such a space may be plotted as a two dimensional
vector space as in Figure 1. Clearly the objective will be the
point indicated "0 and the least desirable state (the origin)
will be the point indicated by 0. The concavity of the contour
lines of equal value (indifference curves) toward the origin, 0,
would be expected from the following considerations. If the
bounds are chosen sufficiently large, for a small y and large x
a saturation effect occurs as x is increased and an increase in
V is achieved most readily by a small increase in y. In other
words x becomes so plentiful that very little value is attached
to obtaining more - the scarce component y is most desired.
Similarly the greatest increase in V is obtained by moving in
the x direction when x is small and y is large. The exact shape
of the contour lines of equal value will, of course, vary wide-
ly under different circumstances but will remain in general con-
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cave toward the origin if the bounds are sufficiently large.
The importance of the above characteristic is perhaps best
illustrated by comparing the (concave) contour lines of equal
value for V with two commonly employed types of measures of ef-
fectiveness - the ratio or "exchange rate" type and the linear
weight type. In the ratio type the ratio of unit effort per
unit return is taken as the measure of effectiveness, e.g. -
dollar cost per kill, etc. This measure is plotted in Figure 2
showing lines on which the ratio is constant. In the linear
weight type the two "incomparable" components are assigned rela-
tive weights and a function of the form (ax+by) is taken as the
measure of effectiveness. The choice of the weighting factors
a and b may, of course, be a very difficult problem in itself.
' In Figure 3 this measure is plotted showing lines where the
function (ax+by) is constant.
It is apparent by comparing Figures 1 through 3 that in cer-
tain regions the ratio or linear weight type may approximate V
very closely (particularly if the weights are suitably chosen),
but there will always be some region in which both types repre-
sent a direction of increasing value which is orthogonal to the
direction in which the value function V increases. This is e-
quivalent to saying that the absolute magnitudes involved are ig-
nored by the ratio and linear weight types of measure of effec-
tiveness. It is incumbent that such be taken into consideration
when either of these types is used to approximate V.
'2h

EQUAL VALUE CONTOURS - V BA§ED ON PREFERENCE
FIGURE 1
EQUAL VALUE CONTOURS - V BASED ON RATIO TYPE
MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS'
FIGURE 2
EQUAL VALUE CONTOURS - BASED ON LINEAR WEIGHT





As an hypothetical example, but typical of problems en-
countered in military operations research studies, suppose that
the U. S. Navy has the problem of developing and procuring an
anti-submarine weapon system. The system is to be procured dur-
ing time of peace for use against a potential enemy in the event
of war. Suppose further that the possible outcomes of selecting
any of several feasible systems can be described by a vector of
two dimensions but that the two components are not directly com-
parable. Specifically, suppose that the two components are dol-
lar cost which is subject to a peacetime budgetary constraint,
and the expected return from a particular system which can be ex-
pressed, say, in number of enemy submarines destroyed during the
period of interest. Now the space of alternatives is bounded by
the budgetary limitations on expenditure and the number of sub-
marines which the enemy is capable of producing during the time
period of interest. Adoption of an appropriate mathematical
model should permit the estimation of the cost of procurement and
operation of the system and the expected return of the system ex-
pressed in number of submarines destroyed. These two quantities
express the possible outcomes which might result from the selec-
tion of any particular feasible anti-submarine weapon system.
This hypothetical situation was presented to the second
year students of the Operations Analysis curriculum at the U. S.
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, and they were
asked, individually, to express their preferences between various
possible outcomes which might result under such circumstances.
The detailed instructions given are included as Appendix III.
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As an initial trial thirty eight choice pairs were given. These
proved insufficient to approximate the value function V. The
basic thirty eight were then supplemented as necessary for each
subject in order to complete the approximate determination of V.
As anticipated the function V differed with each subject though
there were certain similarities among them all. The contour
lines of equal value for a representative subject are plotted in
Figure k. Even in such an artificial situation the anticipated
concavity feature was in evidence. In order to construct a
specific value function the following conditions were assumed:
V(3) = 1
V(0) =
The resulting value function is shown in Figure 5.
Theoretically such a procedure can be employed in choosing
a measure of effectiveness for a wide class of operations re-
search problems. Practically, of course, there may be a number
of difficulties. In an organization such as the United States
Navy the mere identification of the subject may be a problem
within itself. The techniques to be employed in determining the
preferences of the subject, e.g. - construction of tests, would
require much more careful consideration than given in the above
hypothetical example. However such difficulties seem unavoidable
if the sensation of preference is to be adopted as a basis for a
numerical measure of effectiveness. Rejection of the numerical
character of the measure of effectiveness would be most unsatis-
factory. Yet if preference is not adopted as the basis for meas-
ure of effectiveness, the (perhaps) more formidable difficulty of
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CHARACTERISTICS OF PREFERENCE AND INDIFFERENCE
From the definition of the single fundamental relation R
and its postulated characteristics (D.2 and P.l), intuitive no-
tions of the relations P (preference) and I (indifference) as
defined (D.3 and D.K) are readily proved, e.g. - the following
characteristics:
(a) xPy and yPz imply xPz (transitivity of P)
(b) xPy and yRz, or xRy and yPz imply xPz (transitivity of
P and R in sequence)
(c) xly and ylz imply xlz (transitivity of I
)
(d) x= y implies xly (reflexivity of I
)
Proof:
(a) xPy implies xRy by D.3- Suppose zRx * since xRy it fol-
lows that zRy by transitivity, P. 1(b). But also by hy-
pothesis yPz which implies yRz by D.3- Since the sup-
position leads to a contradiction it may be asserted
that zR'x.' Now by D.3 and P. 1(b) xRz , hence xPz.
(b) Both hypotheses imply xRz by D.3 and P. 1(b). Suppose
zRx. zRx and yRz imply yRx by P.l(b), but this con-
tradicts the (first) hypothesis that xPy which implies
yR'x. Similarly zRx and xRy imply zRy, but this contra-
dicts the (second) hypothesis that yPz which implies
zR'y. Since both hypotheses are contradicted by the sup-
position that zRx, it may be asserted that zR'x which by




(c) By D.*f the hypothesis means xRy and yRx, and also yRz
and zRy. By P. 1(b) it follows that xRz and zRx which
means xlz by DA.
(d) Since x = y by hypothesis, it follows that xRy and yRx





1. Situation As a naval planner you must select from several a-
vailable an anti-submarine weapon system. The chosen system, se-
lected in time of peace, is expected to be employed against a po-
tential enemy in the event of hositilties. Assume the following
conditions:
(a) Cost of a system includes procurement and operation dur-
ing the useful life of a system.
(b) Useful life of all available systems essentially equal.
(c) Cost of a system can be expressed in dollar units and is
subject to a budgetary constraint.
(d) Money not expended for this purpose will be available
for other purposes.
(e) The enemy submarine potential during the useful life of
the systems can be estimated with good accuracy.
(f
)
The probable damage which can be inflicted on the enemy
submarine force by a given weapon system during its use-
ful life can be estimated with good accuracy.
2. Instructions On your work sheet the possible outcomes of the
above situation are depicted as two dimensional vector quantities
The two components are system cost in dollars and expected damage
to the enemy in units of submarines destroyed. A series of
choice pairs are listed. For each choice pair indicate which
choice is considered preferable by circling the preferred choice.
If the choices are considered equally acceptable circle both
choices. Note that the second listed choice of each pair is an
35

option, i.e. - two possible outcomes are shown each of which
will occur with probability 1/2. The first of each choice pair
may be considered as certain to occur.
Assume budgetary limitations of one billion dollars and an





















In each of the following pairs, circle the preferred choice.
























































































based on subjective preferences,

